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Explaining and Fixing the ‘Weak Governance Curse’ in Resource-Rich Least Developed
Countries

Patrícia G. Ferreira and Landry Signé
(Stanford University)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
There is a resource boom in the least developed countries, including those in Southern Africa.
In order to translate their resource wealth into positive development outcomes in the long
run, these countries need to have strong domestic governance systems. Yet, governance
indicators in resource-rich LDCs have stagnated or deteriorated in the last decades. We use a
new institutional analysis with a focus on path dependence theory to argue that these
countries are caught in a “weak governance curse”. Besides having inherited dysfunctional
governance paths from past critical junctures, rent-seeking behavior associated with resource
rents constitutes a major contemporary political economy obstacle to successful governance
reform in these countries. Although these dysfunctional governance systems have become
extremely resilient to change, we build a theoretical case as to why global regulatory
mechanisms can serve as potential tools to provoke gradual feedback effects to disrupt this
negative equilibrium.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Introduction
There is a resource boom happening in the poorest countries in the world. In 2012, twenty-two out
of the forty-nine countries which the United Nations classifies among the least developed countries
(LDCs) were already exploiting or were expecting to shortly exploit significant amounts of natural
resources (UNCTAD, 2012). Nineteen of these resource-rich LDCs are African countries, including
five members of the Southern African Development Community (Angola, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia).1 Academic research shows that resource wealth can
only be translated into improved human development outcomes in the presence of good domestic
1We

use a broad definition of resource-rich to include LDCs that exploit or are about to exploit significant
resources such as Angola, Mali, CAR, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, Niger, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Yemen.
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governance systems (North, 1995; Brousseau & Glachant, 1995). Yet, all these LDCs have weak
domestic governance systems.2 The resource-curse literature alerts that if resource-rich LDCs
cannot bridge their domestic governance deficits, they will end up with worse development
indicators in the long run, and will more likely be ruled by authoritarian regimes and fall victim to
political instability and civil conflicts than their resource-deprived peers (Auty, 1993; Sachs &
Warner, 1995; Karl, 2005; Humphrey, Sachs & Stiglitz, 2007; Ross, 2012). A most pressing question
in developing circles is therefore how to positively influence the governance paths of resource-rich
LDCs. This question remains, however, wide open.
Despite massive efforts and resources invested in multilateral and bilateral development
assistance to promote domestic governance reform in the last decade, many developing countries,
and resource-rich LDCs in particular, have seen no significant improvements in their domestic
governance systems (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010). Why is this the case? How can this be
fixed? Using a new institutional analysis with a focus on path dependence theory, we argue that
improving domestic governance systems in resource-rich LDCs is an Augean endeavor because
these countries are caught in a double trap (Collier, 2010). First, historical factors account for the
development of dysfunctional governance paths in resource-rich LDCs. Such paths became resistant
to change over time (Section 3). Second, rent-seeking behavior associated with resource rents
constitutes a major contemporary political economy obstacle to successful governance reform in
these countries (Section 3). As a consequence, improving governance systems in resource-rich LDCs
is an intractable problem, and the strategy of promoting governance reform through development
assistance has proven insufficient to break what we call “the weak governance curse”.
New global regulatory mechanisms (GRMs), such as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative and securities disclosures for extractive corporations in home countries, have recently
been created to provoke feedback effects in the domestic governance systems of these countries,
alongside governance reform attempts through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Although
there is so far no empirical research determining the potential impact of these mechanisms in
addressing what we call the “weak governance curse”, we use path dependence insights (Section 5)
to build a theoretical case as to why it is possible to conceive of GRMs as tools to provoke gradual
breakthroughs in extremely dysfunctional governance systems. We start by providing a brief
presentation of the analytical framework (Section 2).

2. Brief Analytical Framework
An extensive body of literature investigates why significant amounts of capital and time dedicated
to promote governance reforms through bilateral and multilateral assistance have apparently failed
to generate noteworthy results. Michael Trebilcock (2012), for example, identifies four obstacles
that impede effective rule of law reforms in developing countries: (1) resource constraints
(including lack of financial, technical and human capacity); (2) socio-cultural-historical constraints
2We

use a broad definition of governance that includes Fukuyama´s circumscribed conception involving state
capacity (“government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services”, Fukuyama, 2003) and
national mechanisms of democratic accountability (Kaufmann &Kraay, 2007).
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(related to values, norms and attitudes adverse to the rule of law that prevent formal reforms from
becoming effective); (3) political economy constraints (including lack of domestic demand for
reforms and supply-side vested interests that derail or obstruct reform attempts); (4) legal origins
that determine the subsequent performance of legal institutions (path dependence).
This extremely useful classification can be extended beyond rule of law reforms, to
governance reforms in general. For the sake of simplicity, and to highlight the main points of this
article, however, we concentrate on a single approach, that of the new institutionalism. In the last
three decades, new institutionalist scholars have investigated the mechanisms of institutional
formation and institutional change. Economics and political science scholars have concluded that
institutions are resilient to change due to path dependence (Kay, 2003; Pierson, 2004; North, 2005;
David, 2007; Zamagni, 2010; Signé, 2011; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). The concept of path
dependence illuminates how past choices and events have both determined how current
governance systems were originally shaped and have possibly created significant obstacles to
institutional reform. To Allan M. Williams and Vladimir Balaz (2007, p. 37): “path dependence exists
when the outcome of a process depends on its past history, on a sequence of decisions made by
agents and resulting outcomes, and not only on contemporary conditions.”
The path dependence literature compellingly explains why and how governance systems
change. The concept of a critical juncture is key to understanding this process. An initial
extraordinary event destabilizes an existing governance system by provoking dramatic shifts in
domestic payoffs, thus opening the way to significant institutional change. This critical juncture
enables the inauguration of a new governance path, which gets reinforced and stabilizes over time,
becoming resilient to change. The same critical juncture can create a path that is functional in one
system and dysfunctional in another, depending on the circumstances (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2012).
We use an expanded concept of path dependence – encompassing legal (institutional)
origins and demand-side political economy constraints, as defined by Trebilcock (2012) – to argue
that: 1) most resource-rich LDCs have inherited dysfunctional governance systems, which were
reinforced over time, and are now “locked in”; 2) supply-side vested interests and rent-seeking
behavior (see Section 4 for a comprehensive presentation of the concept) further complicate the
picture. In other words, promoting effective governance reform has become intractable, and these
countries are currently “trapped” in a weak governance curse. We assume that lack of resources is
not the biggest challenge due to the massive amounts of external resources invested in governance
reforms, and also the potential domestic financial resources available for resource-rich countries.
We also assume that socio-cultural constraints, if confirmed, would not represent a defining factor.
In Section 5 of this paper we use path dependence concepts to envision three potential ways
in which GRMs could interact with extremely dysfunctional domestic governance systems. First,
these mechanisms can be used to provoke an external shock in a stable governance system. This
may destabilize the system and create a critical juncture that will set up a new governance path.
Paul Pierson (2004) argues that in cases where the institutional path seems so locked-in that all
internal strategies have proven insufficient to break the bad equilibrium, only external shocks will
be effective in promoting change. This would be the case, for example, with external military
interventions.

30

Ferreira and Signé, ‘The Weak Governance Curse’
A second possibility is to use GRMs to help foster gradual internal changes. This idea is
based on two assumptions. The first assumption – as suggested by Kathleen Thelen (2003) – is that
institutional changes do not depend on external shocks. Internal dynamics, even in bounded paths,
are still fluid, and change is always occurring, however small. For Thelen it is always possible to
find endogenous avenues to provoke feedback effects in stable dynamics. Collin Crouch and Henry
Farrel (2004) expand Thelen’s theory, arguing that often there are potential but dormant
endogenous alternative mechanisms that can open new paths or that may provoke feedback effects
to disrupt the dynamics of a dependent path. We argue, differently from these authors, that
exogenous GRMs can operate in the same fashion that potential endogenous mechanisms operate,
offering an innovative avenue that domestic actors may or may not use to set a new path in the
domestic sphere. Thus, our second assumption is that external mechanisms can help foster internal
changes. The idea proposed here, that exogenous institutional mechanisms can serve as key options
to provoke feedback effects in extraordinarily resilient dysfunctional governance paths is grounded
in a combination of Pierson’s and Thelen’s theories. Our research is then interpretative with a
comparative historical method (Mahoney, 2004), systematically identifying the processes of
continuity and change over time with the corresponding paths.3

3. The Paths of Resource-Rich LDCs
Twenty-two LDCs have been either experiencing a marked growth in resource exploitation or are
expected to do so in the near future. According to the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann,
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010), these countries have weak governance systems, some well below the
world and regional averages. Virtually all of these countries fell under direct or indirect colonial
control by European states between the sixteenth to the late nineteenth century (Table 1).
Country
DRC
Niger
Mozambique
Chad
Sierra Leone
Central Afr. Republic
Guinea
Mali
Afghanistan
Equatorial Guinea
Senegal

Colonial Power
King Leopold/Belgium
France
Portugal
France
UK
France
France
France
UK
Spain
France

Country
Sudan
South Sudan
Zambia
Yemen
Tanzania
Cameroon
Angola
Timor Leste
Sao Tome Prince
Liberia
Uganda

Colonial Power
France
France
UK
UK
UK
France
Portugal
Portugal/Indonesia
Portugal
UK

Colonization by foreign powers has been widely recognized as a critical juncture for the formation
of institutional paths. Acemoglu & Robinson (2012), for example, argue that there is a strong
3For

a detailed description of the comparative historical method used in this article, please read the full
article of Mahoney (2004).
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correlation between extractive institutions established by European powers in colonies with low
settlement rates and the weakness of current governance systems in these former colonies. Others
argue that additional factors, such as harmonization of institutional transplants with local
institutions or values (Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, 2003), integration of indigenous constituencies
in colonial institutions (Daniels et al, 2010), capture of extractive institutions by authoritarian local
elites after independence (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2012) have all played a role to either mitigate or
reinforce the dysfunctional governance paths in former extractive colonies. Once dysfunctional
governance systems initiate at a certain critical juncture and are reinforced over time they likely
become “locked in”, making governance reform an intractable enterprise in these countries.
It is beyond the scope of this article to propose a complete analysis of the colonial strategy
and subsequent institutional evolution of each of these 22 countries. The following anecdotal
evidence is intended to paint a general picture of how, likely because of high levels of settler
mortality, most of the resource-rich LDCs were mainly extractive colonies, with institutions
controlled by small elites, which created structures to more effectively exploit natural resources
and cash crops. These dysfunctional extractive institutions were generally reinforced by different
factors over time.
DRC (former Belgian Congo), Chad (former Ubangui-Shari) and the Central African Republic,
for example, were subjected to the system of European concessionary companies. The companies
were offered concessions to exploit natural resources over large parts of the territories. Sierra
Leone also experienced decades of rule by corporate concession. The Sierra Leone Company was
incorporated in London and received authority from the British Crown to explore large portions of
land and to “make laws until the settlers were capable of making their own” (Redden & Schlueter,
2005, p. 6). Portuguese colonies in Africa were also extractive. Gerald Bender (1978) argues that
few free Portuguese were interested in settling in the African colonies, which were associated with
hardship and death. The number and type of Portuguese settlers in Angola (and Mozambique and
Sao Tome) were never in any way similar to those in the “new Europe” colonies, such as Canada or
the USA, or even to those in the Latin American colonies (Bender, 1978). Many other current
resource-rich LDCs had high levels of settler mortality and became “extractive states” dominated by
their European colonizers (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2012).
However, this initial critical juncture is not the only factor explaining the resilience of
dysfunctional governance systems in this group of countries. Richard Sandbrook has extensively
researched the political roots of economic stagnation in African countries. He argues that when
European institutions were transplanted from metropolises to many African colonies, they were
not socially embedded. With continued colonial exploitation they remained strongly dissociated
from society. Gradually, these uprooted institutions adapted to their function in the new
environment. The result, argues Sandbrook, was the consolidation of patrimonial states, with
political and social regimes based on “personal rule” (Sandbrook, 1986, p. 319). Most of the African
resource-rich LDCs fell into this category of patrimonial states.
The integration of European institutional models into pre-existing or traditional systems of
maintaining social order was not a common feature in most of the 22 resource-rich LDCs. In French
Equatorial Africa, for example, two very different legal codes were in use. French citizens were
subject to the French legal code, regardless of color. Indigenous peoples were subject to customary
law, but this law was administered not by local authorities but by French representatives (Kritzer,
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2002). Similarly, in Angola there were two types of colonial courts, ordinary and special. The special
courts heard cases involving Portuguese settlers. The ordinary courts, presided over by a colonial
administrative official, heard cases involving “indigenas”, meaning those Angolans considered
“unassimilated and uncivilized”. Until 1961 the Portuguese government officially classified 99% of
all native Angolans as “unassimilated and uncivilized” (Redden & Schlueter, 2005). Indigenous
constituencies were rarely represented in colonial legislative institutions in LDCs.
Therefore, many resource-rich LDCs that are currently experiencing a resource boom – or
are about to do so – have inherited governance frameworks that lack legitimacy among most of the
population, that are patrimonial and non-conducive to local development, governmental
accountability or political participation. After independence, the capture of institutions by
autocratic leaders in most of these countries, compounded by the rivalries of the Cold War,
contributed to the emergence of dysfunctional governance frameworks. As a result, the challenge of
reforming these institutions is daunting. Therefore, it is true that path dependence can help us
understand where these dysfunctional systems originated. The question is whether path
dependence insights can also help us determine how to improve these systems, as we will discuss
in Section 4.
Yet, besides the historical factors that generated and reinforced dysfunctional governance
systems in resource-rich LDCs, there is another element that makes governance reform even more
intractable. Because of the availability of significant resource rents, rent-seeking behavior (Calhoun,
2002) functions as a major contemporary factor that continues to “lock in” already dysfunctional
governance systems in these countries. Although not much discussed in the path dependence
literature, the idea that significant natural resource rents may cause perverse distortions in a
country’s institutions is not new. This idea is addressed in the rentier state literature that has
developed since the 1970s, which we will discuss next.

4. Rent-Seeking Behavior: The Contemporary Trapping Mechanism
There is a long line of studies affirming that rent-seeking behavior, a phenomenon associated with
significant resource rents, has a deleterious impact on political institutions. This literature precedes
the broader literature on the resource curse.
Hossein Mahdavy (1970) introduced the theory of the rentier state in the 1970s. Rentier states are
countries that receive substantial amounts of economic rents from abroad, on a regular basis. These
can be rents from exports of minerals, oil and other natural resources, or even aid. In these states
significant income and wealth derive from chance or situation, instead of resulting from labor and
constant capital investments (Yates, 1996). This certainty of unearned rewards would cause a
rentier mentality in leading political and economic actors, reducing their incentives to advance or to
accept important institutional reforms favouring productive activities and collective prosperity.
The rentier state literature claims that ruling elites in oil states become divorced from and
unaccountable to the country’s citizens. Some factors facilitate rent-seeking behavior in rentier
economies. First, according to Fadil (as cited in Yates, 1996): “the rentier state becomes the main
intermediary between the oil [or mineral] sector and the rest of the economy”. Second, access to
substantial rents allows state actors to buy off opposition and to repress any contestation of
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authority. Third, unlike other countries rentier states do not need to build tax systems in order to
capture resources. A tax bureaucracy has been historically associated with facilitating the flow of
information, strengthening social and political pressure and providing incentives to institution
building (Karl, 2004, p. 665). Auty (2006) affirms that high rents create incentives to state capture
“because it confers immediate personal and political benefits”. In contrast, wealth creation (via
manufactures, for example) is a long-term process, whose revenues may benefit others down the
line and not current actors. The captured rents are diverted from the competitive economy and
invested in inefficient state bureaucracy and national industries, or are stolen by elites (Khan and
Jomo, 2000).
In The Third Wave [of Democratization], Samuel Huntington (1991) also called attention to
the correlation between oil rents, weak tax systems and weak demand for democratic
accountability. More recently, while undertaking comparative studies of contemporary oil states,
Terry L. Karl (2004, p. 106) argued that oil revenues led states to become “over-extended, overcentralized and captured by special interests”. In 2006, while editing essays on many promising
1990s transitions to democracy which ended up slowing down, reversing or collapsing, Michael
Dauderstadt and Arne Schildberg (2006, p. 7) affirmed: “Authoritarian rentier economies are often
the root cause of [the] lack of transition [to democracy] and of subsequent underdevelopment,
conflict and terrorism”. In 2006 Pius Fisher analyzed the difficulty of implementing institutional
reforms in Tanzania, concluding that: “rent-seeking is probably the main impediment to economic
development in general and to reforming economic policy in particular”.
In a 2006 study Richard Auty (Dauderstadt & Schildberg, 2006) argues that the perverse
incentives of high rents were the main explanation for diverging development paths among
developing countries, mediated by institutions. Kurt Weyland (2010) also argues that the rentier
state theory can explain why resource-rich Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are adopting radical
leftist and increasingly authoritarian policies, diverging from the trend of more moderate changes
(towards leftist policies or towards rightist policies) negotiated within democratic institutions in
the rest of Latin America. For Weyland (2010, p. 145): “Bolivia’s move from leftist moderation to
radicalism, which occurred soon after the discovery of huge natural gas reserves, provides striking
evidence for this novel twist on rentier state arguments”. Sebastian L. Mazzuca (2013) similarly
argues that the Chinese and Indian massive demand for natural resources goes a long way in
explaining the rise of what he calls “rentier populist” governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador
and, to a lesser extent, Argentina (Mazzuca, 2013, p. 108). Larry Diamond (2010) has also pointed
to the “oil curse” as one of the main explanations as to why oil-rich Arab countries have remained
so anomalously immune to the various worldwide waves of democratization.4
Resource-rich LDCs are therefore facing two distinct trapping mechanisms: their
dysfunctional governance systems originated in the past and became dependent over time; and
now rent-seeking makes these governance systems even more resilient by creating an important
incentive for contemporary political and economic actors to prevent attempts to steer the

To be sure Diamond also points to religion and culture, to the perfection of authoritarian statecraft by Arab
countries over time and to international geopolitics as other factors that help to explain the lack of liberal
democracies in the Middle East. Yet for him the real game changer for the region would be a “prolonged, steep
decline in world oil prices” because oil rents are enabling those countries to constantly control and suppress
the political and social pressures for democratization.
4
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governance systems towards a more functional path.
The existence of this double trapping mechanism does not mean that it is impossible to shift
paths in the future. One possibility is a new critical juncture, like the external intervention imposed
on Afghanistan, or the ones inaugurated by social revolutions in the Middle East. However, the longterm outcomes of the American intervention in Afghanistan and of the 2011 Arab Spring are by no
means clear. The July 2013 popularly-backed military coup against the Morsi regime in Egypt, and
its quick turn to a repressive and violent military regime are sober illustrations of how difficult it is
to harness a critical juncture to inaugurate and maintain a functional institutional path. Are critical
junctures the only possible, if uncertain, way out of these trapping mechanisms? We address this
question next.

5. Global Regulatory Mechanisms as Escape Routes
Both the explanatory and retrospective path dependence literature (David, 2007; Zamagni, 2010;
Kay, 2003; Williams & Balaz, 2007; North, 2005; Arthur, 1989; Pierson, 2004) and the emerging
prospective path dependence literature (Levin, 2009; Prado & Trebilcock, 2011) that seeks to
illuminate how countries break free from, or may be able to break free from, a dysfunctional
governance path, have so far disregarded the possibility that global regulatory mechanisms may in
fact interact with internal dynamics, gradually provoking feedback effects in a dysfunctional
equilibrium. Pierson’s (2004) theory that in some cases external interventions have proven key to
forcefully disrupting the dysfunctional governance trap seems as compelling as Thelen’s (2003)
theory that internal dynamics are never totally locked in, and that endogenous avenues have often
been responsible for breaking a dysfunctional path. One theory does not exclude the other. We
argue that external factors such as global regulatory mechanisms should be more thoroughly
investigated as factors that can explain how to break extremely resilient dysfunctional governance
paths, even in the absence of a critical juncture. These external mechanisms should be taken into
consideration by reformers searching for ways to address the complex trapping mechanisms that
keep dysfunctional domestic governance paths locked in.
In this article we draw from Julia Black’s (2002) broad definition of regulation, meaning:
“the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of others according to defined standards
or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes […].” By
global regulatory mechanisms (GRMs) we mean the institutionalized policy instruments that are
created by social, business or political actors to set standards and to facilitate informationgathering and information-sharing in order to influence the behavior of other social, business or
political actors that are located in foreign states (Black, 2002; Levi-Faur, 2011). To be clear, it is not
necessary for the mechanism to be created at a global institutional setting, such as international or
transnational organizations. If a state unilaterally creates a regulatory mechanism that, although
domestic, has as the main objective to influence the behavior of social, business or policy actors
located beyond its national borders, it falls into our definition of GRM.
GRMs are extremely diversified in terms of the subjects they intend to regulate and their
objectives (Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 2005). We shall therefore clarify which GRMs we are
referring to in this article. First, in terms of subjects, our focus is on GRMs created to influence state
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behavior, not the behavior of social or business actors. Second, in terms of objectives, we do not
deal with the more traditional GRMs, designed to influence the behavior of states towards each
other (e.g. international security treaties), or to foster inter-state cooperation in managing global
goods or addressing global problems (e.g. multilateral trade or environmental agreements). We
specifically focus on modern GRMs, designed to influence how other states behave within their own
territories (Slaugther & Burke-White, 2007). Yet, our focus is even more specific, since we do not
deal with those GRMs that seek to influence how states behave towards their own individuals or
particular groups (e.g. human rights treaties).
Thus, we refer to a very specific group of GRMs, created by social, business or political
actors to influence how other states shape their own domestic governance systems to affect their
own development outcomes, or to address domestic problems that cause international concern.
Examples are World Bank aid or loan agreements to promote good governance and rule of law in
developing countries, or bilateral development assistance agreements between countries. We also
refer to newer GRMs such as transnational multistakeholder initiatives created with the objective
to improve domestic governance systems in developing countries, e.g. the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative. Finally, we include new forms of extraterritorial regulations that have been
created in developed countries to, albeit indirectly, cause positive feedback effects in domestic
governance systems in foreign developing countries, such as USA and EU extraterritorial securities
disclosure regulations in the extractive sector, whose ultimate purpose is to increase the
transparency in the management of natural resources in resource-rich but governance-poor
developing countries.
To be sure, the idea proposed in this article is not completely new. Indeed, the fact that
global mechanisms interact with – and may have significant implications for – the internal
dynamics of domestic governance paths has apparently guided the analysis of Pistor and Milhaupt
(2008) in their book “Law and Capitalism”. Pistor and Milhaupt (2008, p. 192) argue that domestic
governance structures, including legal systems that are the focus of their study, experience a highly
interactive process of action and strategic reaction with global institutions and actors. In four out of
six cases that the authors investigate in the book, the exposure of a domestic governance regime to
international markets and practices has proved to be a prominent catalyst for change, even in the
absence of a major external shock.
For Pistor and Milhaupt, external investors demanding better governance in capitalimporting countries explain the spread of laws protecting individual property rights in countries
that apparently lacked sufficient internal demand for property rights reform (p. 7). They argue that
in a globalized world, key constituencies of domestic governance systems are no longer
predominantly insiders. The question is why and how the participation of outsiders has enhanced
the protective function of property law in some of the cases they analyze. The authors argue that
outsiders demand better governance in foreign capital importing countries because they do not
have easy access to internal networks of relations and the informal property protections on which
privileged insiders rely. For Pistor and Milhaupt (p. 194) there is a second reason why outsiders,
rather than insiders, promote mechanisms to influence foreign domestic systems: sometimes
outsiders have the political leverage to promote institutional mechanisms that domestic actors lack.
Pistor and Milhaupt also explain why external constituencies rely on the interaction with
domestic constituencies to obtain better results. Despite their greater leverage to propose
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institutional mechanisms, external constituencies often lack the legitimacy to use these
mechanisms to advance their own interests. The combination of the leverage of outside
constituencies and the legitimacy provided by internal constituencies is key for the external
mechanisms to ignite internal change. In the authors’ words (p. 194): “[...] the uncoordinated but
cumulative efforts of foreign and domestic actors appear to make a powerful combination for
inducing institutional change in an increasingly globalized world”. Pistor and Milhaupt’s insights
are extremely useful for investigating whether external mechanisms could serve as tools to enable
this combination of leverage of external constituencies and legitimacy of internal constituencies to
break the resilient dysfunctional path in resource-rich but governance-poor countries.
One difference between Pistor and Milhaupt’s study and the inquiry proposed in this article
relates to the academic discussion over descriptive versus prospective and normative value of path
dependence scholarship. Pistor and Milhaupt are very clear that their study on the influence of
global economic interactions in domestic legal systems is descriptive, not normative (p. 10). Their
work is not intended to serve as a guide to policy-making, but rather to understand why some
countries made certain institutional choices in the past and to predict what choices may be made in
the future. However, siding with those that think that path dependence insights can also be used in
a prescriptive manner, we argue that GRMs should also be seen strategically as institutional choices
beyond existing endogenous avenues that reformers could use to provoke feedback effects in
governance systems that are caught in complex trapping mechanisms, such as is the case in most
resource-rich LDCs. Our theory is that in some cases GRMs may be intentionally harnessed as tools
to ignite or to strengthen internal processes of change, by enabling the interaction of external and
internal pro-reform constituencies.
Although GRMs should also be seen as viable alternatives to fix the “weak governance
curse” in resource-rich LDCs, we should be cautious not to assume that they necessarily have a
positive impact on reforms. In fact, the type of GRM as well as the domestic political environment
and its institutional configuration are key factors that will determine whether a GRM may succeed
or fail, or even have a negative unintended impact. As demonstrated by Signé (2011), an external
mechanism is less likely to succeed in case of institutional intrusion and absence of a strong basis of
domestic supports. Institutional intrusion is defined as “a semi-strategic and semi-structural
process through which national actors are partly forced to adopt new institutions or policies, and
agree to do so only because of asymmetry in power, structural constraints (structure), or potential
benefits (strategies) of the international actors. In this context, relevant and non-constraining
alternatives are quasi inexistent, but national actors still have (limited) room for negotiations”
(Signé, 2011, p. 181). Relevant illustrations of institutional intrusions are first generations of
structural adjustment policies in Africa. Leaders, who had extremely limited room for manoeuver,
were not really participating in policy formulation, and were almost constrained to accept coercive
conditionalities to receive vital funding. Additionally, most of these leaders were not willing or able
to effectively implement such policies, which had led to mitigated results.
GRMs are more likely to succeed and have strong positive impacts in case of strong
domestic support through an institutional inclusion process. Institutional inclusion is then defined
as “a semi-strategic and semi-ideational process through which national or regional actors
intentionally include current international strategies (or solutions) to shape a new institution or
policy with the aim of increasing the probability of [domestic] acceptance (via recognition, social
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suitability, real or perceived common values) […] Inclusion does not necessarily imply success or
failure […] Once institutions or policies are adopted, dynamics can vary greatly” (Signé, 2011, p.
181). Institutional inclusion is more likely to lead to both rapid (immediate) and slow moving
changes, as domestic actors play a more active role than in the semi-structural intrusion process.
Relevant illustrations of institutional inclusions are the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
at the national level, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development at the regional level. In
order to facilitate the acceptance and success of their strategies, but also because they promote
shared (real or apparent) international values, leaders are proposing global strategies that
integrate several internationally proposed solutions.
These concepts were successfully tested to explain the dynamics of policy innovation and
continuity as well as the paradigm shifts in the political responses to the twenty-first century
versus twentieth century economic and financial crises in Africa (Signé, 2011).

6. Conclusion
This article argues that two trapping mechanisms – path dependence and rent-seeking behavior –
explain why most resource-rich LDCs are locked into a “weak governance curse”. We suggest that
path dependence insights should be used in a forward looking manner to provide guidance for
those actors that are seeking to devise mechanisms to help reformers in these countries to escape
this double trap. We side with those in the path dependence literature that believe that a
dysfunctional path, however resilient, is still dynamic, open to internal mechanisms that enable
gradual change, and therefore, is often not completely dependent on external shocks to escape the
trap. However, we propose that in intractable cases such as those faced by resource-rich but
governance-poor countries, external institutional mechanisms that enable a combination of the
leverage of external pro-reform constituencies and the legitimacy of internal pro-reform
constituencies may offer crucial missing choices for pro-reform actors to break dysfunctional paths.
As noted above, we are not proposing that a GRM will always be successful in provoking
internal change in dysfunctional dynamics in resource-rich developing countries. In fact
development assistance agreements, which are one form of GRM, have proven insufficient in most
cases. We are proposing that different types of global regulatory mechanisms may expand the
limited choices internal reformers currently face. Our argument is that in some cases exogenous
mechanisms may interact with existing endogenous mechanisms. Reformers could use global
regulatory mechanisms in their attempts to destabilize the dysfunctional equilibrium from the
inside. External mechanisms would therefore reinforce a trend or force already present in internal
dynamics. External mechanisms can also be used to bring new actors into the internal dynamics,
creating a new path for change. In other cases, however, exogenous mechanisms may prove
ineffective, provoking no change at all in internal dynamics. Whether an external mechanism will be
effective or not is largely unpredictable. Much depends on the characteristics of the governance
path and current situation in each country: the political economy obstacles to reform, the different
endogenous levels of demand for reform, the various political and technical capacities of internal
actors, etc. There is also a need to be cautious about the potential unintended negative effects of
GRMs in the domestic governance system.
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Finally, we argue that it is not possible to predict which global regulatory mechanism may
prove the most efficient tool to allow the combination of the leverage of external constituencies and
the legitimacy of internal constituencies to increase the chances of breaking a dysfunctional
governance path. A mechanism that facilitates institutional inclusion by offering more options to
domestic actors would more likely lead to successful reform.
One global mechanism may function well in country A, while not functioning well in country
B, and not functioning at all in country C. Much would depend on the particular internal
circumstances of each country. In this case, it is better to have as many external options as possible,
so that reformers can explore which mechanism may work best for the country in question.
Although some of the proposed concepts (institutional intrusion and institutional inclusion) have
been systematically tested with success (Signé, 2011), this article proposes the theoretical
articulations of our research agenda on path dependence, GRM and other institutional processes
likely to better explain institutional or policy persistence, innovation, success and failure in
developing countries. In upcoming papers, we will further test and develop our theory with
conceptual refinement and empirical investigations of comparative interests.

References
Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and
Poverty. New York: Crown.
Arthur, W.B. 1989. “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events.”
The Economic Journal 99, No. 394: 116-31.
Auty, R.M. 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies - The Resource Curse Thesis. New
York: Routledge.
Auty, R.M. 2006. “Authoritarian Rentier States in a Broader Development Context.” In Dead Ends of
Transition: Rentier Economies and Protectorates, eds. M. Dauderstadt, and A. Schildberg. Frankfurt:
Campus Verlag.
Beblawi, H. and G. Luciani eds. 1987. The Rentier State. London: Croom Helm.
Bender, G.J. 1978. Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Berkowitz, D.; K. Pistor; and J.F. Richard. 2003. “Economic Development, Legality and the
Transplant Effect.” European Economic Review 47, No. 1: 165-95.
Black, J. 2002. “Critical Reflections on Regulation.” Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27: 1-36.
Brousseau, E. and J.M. Glachant, eds. 2008. New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
39

Ferreira and Signé, ‘The Weak Governance Curse’

Calhoun, C. ed. 2002. Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Collier, P. 2010. The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile Prosperity with Nature. London: Allen Lane.
Crouch, C. and H. Farrell. 2004. “Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the
New Determinism.” Rationality and Society 16, No. 1: 5-43.
Daniels, R.J.; M.J. Trebilcock; and L.D. Carson. 2011. “The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law
Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies.” The American Journal of
Comparative Law 59, No. 1: 111-78.
Dauderstadt, M. and A. Schildberg, eds. 2006. Dead Ends of Transition: Rentier Economies and
Protectorates. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
David, P.A. 2007. “Path Dependence: A Foundational Concept for Historical Social Science.”
Cliometrica: Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History 1, No. 2: 91-114.
Diamond, L. 2010. “Why Are There no Arab Democracies?” Journal of Democracy 21, No. 1: 93-112.
Engerman, S.L. and K.L. Sokoloff. 2012. Economic Development in the Americas since 1500:
Endowments and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fisher, P. 2006. Rent-Seeking, Institutions and Reforms in Africa: Theory and Empirical Evidence for
Tanzania. Zurich: Springer.
Gall, T.L. and J.M. Hobby, eds. 2007. Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations. 12th ed., Vol. 4. Detroit:
Thompson Gale.
Humphreys, M.; J.D. Sachs; and J.E. Stiglitz, eds. 2007. Escaping the Resource Curse. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Huntington, S.P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press.
Karl, T.L. 2004. “Oil-Led Development: Social, Political and Economic Consequences.” In C.J.
Cleveland and R.U. Ayres, eds. Encyclopedia of energy. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Karl, T.L. 2005. “Understanding the resource curse.” In Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy
and Development. New York: Open Society Institute Publications.
Kaufmann, D. and A. Kraay. 2007. “Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be
Going?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4370.
40

Ferreira and Signé, ‘The Weak Governance Curse’

Kaufmann, D.; A. Kraay; and M. Mastruzzi. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators:
Methodology and Analytical Issues.” World Bank Research Working Paper 5430.
Kay, A. 2003. “Path Dependency and the CAP.” Journal of European Public Policy 10, No. 3: 405-20.
Khan, M.H. and K.S. Jomo, eds. 2000. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and
Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kingsbury, B.; N. Krisch; and R. Stewart. 2005. “The emergence of global administrative law.” Law &
Contemporary Problems 15-62.
Kritzer, H.M. ed. 2002. Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social and Cultural Encyclopedia. Santa
Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
Levi-Faur, D. 2011. “Regulation & Regulatory Governance.” In D. Levi-Faur ed. Handbook on the
Politics of Regulation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Levin, K.; B. Cashore; S. Bernstein; and G. Auld. 2009. “Playing it Forward: Path Dependency,
Progressive Incrementalism and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change.” IOP
Conference Series: Earth and Environment Science 6 (50) 502002.
Mahdavy, H. 1970. “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The
Case of Iran.” In M.A. Cook, ed. Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of
Islam to the Present Day. London: Oxford University Press.
Mahoney, J. 2004. “Comparative-Historical Methodology.” Annual Review of Sociology 30: 81–101.
Mazzuca, S.L. 2013. “The Rise of Rentier Populism.” Journal of Democracy 24, No. 2: 108-22.
Moore, M. 2007. “How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?” IDS Working Paper 280.
North, D. 1995. “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development.” In J. Harris; J.
Hunter; and C.M. Lewis eds. The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development.
London: Routledge.
North, D. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Pierson, P. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

41

Ferreira and Signé, ‘The Weak Governance Curse’
Prado, M.M. and M.J. Trebilcock. 2011. What Makes Poor Countries Poor? Institutional Determinants
of Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Redden, K.R. and L.L. Schlueter eds. 2005. Modern Legal Systems Encyclopedia. Buffalo: WS Hein.
Ross, M. 2012. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Sachs, J.D. and A.D. Warner. 1995. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” Institute
for International Development, Development Discussion Paper 517a.
Sandbrook, R. 1986. “The State and Economic Stagnation in Tropical Africa.” World Development 14,
No. 3: 319-32.
Signé, L. 2011. “The Political Responses to the Global Economic and Financial Crises in Francophone
Africa from 1980 to 2010: A Paradigm Shift?” African Journal of Political Science and International
Relations 5, No. 4: 179-89.
Slaughter, A.M. and W. Burke-White. 2007. “The Future of International Law is Domestic.” In A.
Nolkaemper and J. Nijman, eds. New Perspectives on the Divide between International and National
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thelen, K. 2003. “How Institutions Evolve: Insights From Comparative Historical Analysis.” In J.
Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Trebilcock, M.J. 2012. “The Rule of Law and Development: In Search of the Holy Grail.” In H. Cisse;
D.D. Bradlow; and B. Kingsbury eds. The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial
Institutions and Global Legal Governance 3. Washington DC: The World Bank.
UNCTAD. 2012. “The Least Developed Countries Report.” United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development.
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldc2012_en.pdf
Weyland, K. 2009. “The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory.”
Comparative Politics 41, No. 2: 145-64.
Williams A.M. and V. Balaz. 2007. “Path-Dependency and Path-Creation Perspectives on Migration
Trajectories: The Economic Experiences of Vietnamese Migrants in Slovakia.” International
Migration 45, No. 2: 37-67.
Yates, D.A. (1996). The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neo-Colonialism in the
Republic of Gabon. Trenton: Africa World Press.
42

Ferreira and Signé, ‘The Weak Governance Curse’

Zamagni, V. 2010. “What is the Message of Understanding the Process of Economic Change for
Economic Historians?” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 21, No. 2: 157-63.

43

